The Battle Of Hubbardton - "No Visible Advantage"

On July 6, 1777, British and German forces under the command of Lieutenant-General John Burgoyne occupied the American fortifications at Fort Ticonderoga and Mount Independence and took control of Lake Champlain.  Outnumbered, American troops retired south to Skenesboro, some by boat, others by land southeast on military roads to Castleton, Vermont.  Burgoyne responded by focusing his attention on those fleeing by boat, and left the pursuit of those who traveled by land to the commander of his Advance Corps, Brigadier-General Simon Fraser, "Knowing how safely I could trust to that officers conduct."  [1] British Lieutenant James Hadden of the Royal Artillery noted in his Journal: "July 6th At daybreak this Morning the retreat of the Enemy was discover'd, and B. Gen'l Frazer, with about 8 or 900 of his own Corps (leaving the rest with the Tents Batteaux's &c &c) pursued them towards Huberton, leaving his Artillery which the Road was not capable of receiving." [2]  

On the morning of July 7th, after a twenty-three mile march, the British Advance Corps made contact with the American rear guard.  Three days later Burgoyne would note in his orders, "On the 7th Brigadier General Fraser at the head of a little more than half of the Advanced Corps... came up with near two thousand of the Enemy, strongly posted, attacked and defeated them with the loss on the Enemy's part of many of their Principal Officers, two hundred men killed on the spot, a much larger number wounded, and about two hundred made prisoner." [3] 

Much of where that fight occurred has been preserved by the State of Vermont.   The Hubbardton Battlefield is now a state park, beautifully maintained by the Division of Historic Preservation and open seasonally from late May to mid-October, Wednesday through Sunday.  

Each July the site hosts a re-enactment on the weekend closest to the anniversary of the battle, this year planned for July 8th and 9th.  Re-enactors from American, British and German units will gather for the weekend, set up their camps below what is now Monument Hill, and early Sunday morning recreate a part of the battle for spectators.  Though neither the "Betsy Ross" nor "Green Mountain Boys" flag ever flew during the Battle of Hubbardton, the site and the event are picturesque and well worth a visit.  Directly in front of the Visitor Center a marble monument from 1859, one of the oldest Revolutionary War battle monuments in the country, commemorates those killed including Colonel Ebenezer Francis of the 11th Massachusetts Regiment of the Continental Line.

Hadden described the fighting and its outcome, noting:  "About 2 o'clock, B. G'l Frazer came up with the party he pursued, who having been joined by some reinforcements intended for the Garrison, considerably out number'd him, and the affair was at least doubtful the Enemy having nearly turned his Flank, when a Detachment under Maj'r Gen'l Reidesil ( The Chasseurs & Jagers) sent as a support very fortunately came up, and checking this attempt of the Enemy they immediately gave way on all sides, Col. Francis who commanded with 200 others were killed, about as many wounded and taken Prisoners. This Detachment being fatigued and having their wounded to take care of, who were dispersed in the Woods, took post here, and no farther pursuit was attempted by that Route. The Troops British and German behaved well on this occasion, unfortunately we gained nothing but honor, and the immediate movements of the Army were incumber'd or rather prevented, it being absolutely necessary to detain this Detachment as a cover for the Wounded, till they cou'd be removed to Tyconderoga & this from many difficulties was not effected for some days, in which time the Enemy recover'd from their panic; this wou'd not have been the case had they been pursued towards Fort Edward by the way of Skeensborough, the Route of the Army pointing that way, whatever ground we drove them from, was gained, and in place of retiring such Detachments the Army wou'd necessarily have moved forward to them. Our loss in ye above Affair was 17 Officers and 109 Rank & File Killed or Wounded." [4] 

Other histories of the battle detail and debate who fought where, and at what hour, such as John Williams The Battle of Hubbardton (it or another is usually available at the Hubbardton Battlefield Visitor Center), and Ennis Duling's critique of Thomas Ansburey's account of the fighting.  Hadden's observation that "we gained nothing but honor" and "the immediate movements of the Army were incumber'd" invite a strategic rather than tactical review of the battle.  The first question to be answered is whether the battle should ever have been fought.  

A 1780 London pamphlet noted the sole purpose of the expedition had originally been to open communications between Canada and British forces in New York City.  Burgoyne was to advance south from Quebec by way of Albany, and separate New England from the other colonies to bring the war to an end.  Prior to the battle, Burgoyne wrote on July 2nd to Sir William Howe, commander in chief of British land forces in North America, that once he captured Fort Ticonderoga, it would be garrisoned with troops from Canada, and "My force will be left complete for future operations." [5]  Burgoyne, in his defense of the failed campaign to Parliament, noted that "... forcing a way to Albany by vigorous exertions against any opposition we might meet, was general and first through the whole army." [6] 

Opening communications with New York did not require the pursuit and destruction of the Northern Army, especially that element which had fled by land from Mount Independence.  On July 6th Burgoyne ordered the 62nd Regiment of Foot to occupy Mount Independence, and the Brunswicker Prince Frederick Regiment Fort Ticonderoga; and "All the rest of the Army to proceed by South Bay"   However, an addendum to these orders reveals conflicting guidance "Every man must now perceive how essential it may be to the King's Service to continue vigorously the pursuit of a flying Enemy.  The Lieut. General therefore depends upon the zeal of the Army not to relax, whatever may be the fatigue, while there is the prospect of overtaking the Fugitives." [7]  On July 11th he wrote of yet another option, and his "... lament that my orders do not give me the latitude I ventured to propose in my original project for the campaign; to make a real effort instead of a feint upon New England." [8] 

Whether Burgoyne intended to destroy the Northern Army, or seize and hold key terrain, "... barely marching through a tract of country, with an enemy rising up behind you at every step, had very little tendency to quell the rebellion, which was the object of the war."  The Saratoga campaign was, that 1780 pamphlet noted, "... a series of misconduct, increasing in such ratio, that each step seems calculated to efface the memory of all that preceded..."  It may be that an extended pursuit and the Battle of Hubbardton was the first of many mistakes Burgoyne would make in 1777. [9]   Captain Charles Stanhope (the Earl of Harrington), who commanded the grenadier company of the 29th Regiment of Foot at Hubbardton, and a few days later became an aide to Burgoyne, noted when questioned in Parliament in 1779 as to whether the retreating Americans could have been pursued further thought not, and that "I think we ran some risk even in pursuing them so far." [10] 

Lieutenant James Digby of the British 53rd Regiment of Foot saw no advantage gained from the fight at Hubbardton or the decision to move south by land rather than over Lake George.  "Many here were of opinion the general had not the least business in bringing the army to Skeensborough, after the precipitate flight of the enemy from Ticonderoga, and tho we had gained a complete victory over them, both at Fort Anne and Hubberton, yet no visible advantage was likely to flow from either except proving the goodness of our troops at the expense of some brave men. They were also of opinion we should have pushed directly to Fort George, where it was pretty certain they had above 400 wagons, 4 horses in each, with stores & and not above 700 men, which would have enabled us to push forward, without waiting for horses from Canada to bring on our heavy artillery, which these discontented persons declared, was much greater than we had the smallest use for."  [11] 

Writing of the dissolution of the Advanced Corps at the time of the surrender on October 17, 1777, prior to the march of the what had become in defeat the "Convention Army", Lieutenant Francis (Lord) Napier noted: "The facility with which we obtained Ticonderoga contributed in a great measure to bring us into our disagreeable Situation. From their quitting that Post before our attack begun, We had conceived the Idea of our being irresistible. What afterwards followed plainly evinced We were not more than Mortals.  The affair of Hubbertown greatly diminished the strength of the Advanced Corps, without doing any material damage to the Rebel Forces." [12] 

[1] Burgoyne, Expedition From Canada, Appendix. p. xvi.  

[2] Hadden, p. 85.

[3] Burgoyne's Orderly Book, p. 33.

[4] Hadden, pp. 85-88.

[5] Remarks On General Burgoyne's State of The Expedition From Canada, pp. 26-29 and 44.

[6] Burgoyne, Expedition From Canada, Narrative, p. 3.

[7] Burgoyne's Orderly Book, pp. 28-29.

[8] Remarks, p. 44. 

[9] Remarks, pp. 50 and 59.   

[10] Burgoyne, Expedition From Canada, p. 48.

[11] Digby, pp. 227-228.

[12] Napier, pp. 324-325.

Next Week: July 2, 1778 - "Three Revolutionary Soldiers"

For more on the Convention Army's 1777 march from Saratoga to Boston, see:

1777 March Blog Home          Overnight Stopping Points          Towns and Villages Along the Way

 Annotated Bibliography